The Catholic Church and Sexual Freedom
On the third of October, the Catholic Church relieved Vatican priest Krzysztof Charamsa of his post. The decision came after a news conference during which the former priest informed the public of his relationship with another man. The Church explicitly bars any man with deep-seated homosexual attractions from being a priest and requires all priests to live a celibate life, making Charamsa a dual violation of Church teaching. After being notified of the Church’s decision, the former priest wrote a passionate letter to Pope Francis within which he condemned the Catholic Church and its treatment of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Specifically, the Church is “frequently violently homophobic” and that it causes “immeasurable suffering” to homosexual Catholics. The Pope has yet to issue a response.
We need to answer two questions when sorting through the morality of the Church’s actions. First, do people everywhere have a right to sexual freedom? By sexual freedom, I mean the ability to live whatever sexual lifestyle one chooses. If we answer this question affirmatively, then prima faci, homosexuals must be respected and allowed to live the life they choose. Second, if there is such a right, can we ever suspend that right? If someone enters an organization that explicitly requires all of its members not to engage in sexual behavior, for instance, does that person give up his or her right to sex?
Isaac Newton is credited with saying that “if I have seen farther, it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants.” It is only by standing tall of the shoulders of those who have gone before us that we can ever hope to achieve something of enduring significance. For that reason, let us survey two philosophers and apply their ethical theories to the moral questions sketched above: Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Mill espouses utilitarianism, the ethical thesis that what is moral is that which produces the most pleasure for the most people. The morality of an action is solely determined by the action’s consequences (i.e., how much pleasure it produces), and so utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism. To the first question, Mill’s answer is, “It depends!”. If acting as if person x has human right y produces the greatest good for the greatest number, then yes, one ought to treat x as if they had y. Conversely, if doing so actually redounded to the greatest suffering for the greatest number, then the utilitarian would have to say that one ought not to treat x as if they had y.
A similar situation occurs when Mill attempts to answer our second question. The only important factor is the consequences of suspending rights. Though I do not know of any relevant sociological surveys, I suspect that the majority of people who hear of the Church’s decision will not have their pleasure increased. Apparently, then, the utilitarian would say that the Catholic Church acted immorally in reliving Charamsa of his priesthood, though for completely different reasons than those most people would give.
Immanuel Kant contrasts with Mill in that he believes that certain actions are intrinsically moral or immoral, regardless of their consequences. That is to say, a certain course of action may actually produce great suffering for the greatest number of people, and yet still be the moral action. Kant’s ethical theory revolves around one central thesis: one ought to act only insofar as everyone in similar circumstances could consistently carry out his action. This is a somewhat clumsy statement of the categorical imperative. From this general principle, Kant derives the principle of human dignity: one ought to act only so that she treats other people as ends in themselves. As St. Augustine said, we are to use things and love people. For this reason, it seems clear that Kant would answer our first question affirmatively: people do have the right to sexual freedom.
To our second question, Kant’s answer is complicated. Looking closely at the categorical imperative, let us ask ourselves a question: what would happen if everyone disregarded the proscriptions that come with being a member of an organization? If Catholic priests, for instance, disobeyed the Church in every way (by having sex, teaching their particular beliefs as opposed to orthodoxy, and so forth), what would happen? In that case, the Church would have no authority whatsoever and would cease to be anything at all. It would appear, therefore, that disobedience to an agreed-upon authority cannot be consistently willed (the phrase agreed-upon is key here for drawing out the contradiction). In short, Charamsa’s actions violate the categorical imperative and are therefore immoral. However, how can Kant consistently say that people have a right to sexual freedom and yet an authority can restrict that right? The answer is that people willingly submit themselves to the authority of an organization or group and therefore willingly give up the right in question. This should be particularly clear in the case of the Catholic Church. That is Kant’s argument, at least, and now we turn to evaluate Kant and Mill.
At the outset, it is important to remember that emotions play no role in a rational assessment of the Church’s actions. We must approach that assessment with objectivity and disinterest, hoping to get at the truth rather than a confirmation of what we already believed to be true. With that in mind, I offer my thoughts. Recall that the two question before us are (1) Do we have a right to sexual freedom?, and (2) Can that right ever be overridden?.
With respect to (1), I do believe we have a right to sexual freedom. Mill’s justification is doubtless faulty because all he can justify is treating people as if they had rights; he cannot actually ground real human rights. Moreover, people still have rights even if there are bad consequences of respecting those rights. Kant’s conclusion fairs well with our moral intuitions, so I must declare him the winner. I would ground human rights, not only in the categorical imperative, but also in the intrinsic worth of every human being.
However, a qualifier is important here. We do not have the right, for instance, to indulge in our sexual fantasies if they involve harm to others (rape, violence, etc.). Moreover, we arguably do not have the right to lifestyles that harm ourselves. We do not have the right, for instance, to destroy ourselves with drugs, to submit ourselves to sexually transmitted infections, and to harm in any way our bodies during sexual intercourse. These qualifications are relevant to the case at hand because some moral philosophers have argued against a homosexual lifestyle on just these grounds. They have cited various medical studies that indicate the life threatening nature of homosexual intercourse. If these arguments are valid, the conclusion appears to be that we do not have the right to a homosexual lifestyle. However, I have never personally investigated these medical studies, and so must withhold judgement. Operating under the assumption that no factors might override our right to sexual freedom, I must answer the first question affirmatively.
Regarding (2), it seems to me that various things might override a right to sexual freedom. It seems to me that willingly signing the right away does the trick. When Charamsa, for instance, became a priest in the Catholic Church, he willingly agreed not to engage in homosexual behavior. More generally, he agreed to teach Catholic doctrine and to act in accordance with those teachings. The Church did not force him to be a priest, after all. It seems to me entirely inappropriate for him to openly contradict the Church, as he is still a member of that Church. The mature and respectable course of action, I think, would have been for him to renounce his priesthood and then declared his lifestyle to the public. No one can force Charamsa to live a certain lifestyle. However, for him to agree to live a certain way and then openly refuse to do so, is merely for him to fail to be a man of his word. Furthermore, I find Kant’s appeal to the categorical imperative convincing. If everyone were to break their vows to an organization, vows would be meaningless indeed.
To end our discussion, we all have the right to live our lives as we choose. However, we do not have the right to break our vows. Let us strive to be people of our word, and to maintain personal integrity in all that we do.
We need to answer two questions when sorting through the morality of the Church’s actions. First, do people everywhere have a right to sexual freedom? By sexual freedom, I mean the ability to live whatever sexual lifestyle one chooses. If we answer this question affirmatively, then prima faci, homosexuals must be respected and allowed to live the life they choose. Second, if there is such a right, can we ever suspend that right? If someone enters an organization that explicitly requires all of its members not to engage in sexual behavior, for instance, does that person give up his or her right to sex?
Isaac Newton is credited with saying that “if I have seen farther, it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants.” It is only by standing tall of the shoulders of those who have gone before us that we can ever hope to achieve something of enduring significance. For that reason, let us survey two philosophers and apply their ethical theories to the moral questions sketched above: Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. Mill espouses utilitarianism, the ethical thesis that what is moral is that which produces the most pleasure for the most people. The morality of an action is solely determined by the action’s consequences (i.e., how much pleasure it produces), and so utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism. To the first question, Mill’s answer is, “It depends!”. If acting as if person x has human right y produces the greatest good for the greatest number, then yes, one ought to treat x as if they had y. Conversely, if doing so actually redounded to the greatest suffering for the greatest number, then the utilitarian would have to say that one ought not to treat x as if they had y.
A similar situation occurs when Mill attempts to answer our second question. The only important factor is the consequences of suspending rights. Though I do not know of any relevant sociological surveys, I suspect that the majority of people who hear of the Church’s decision will not have their pleasure increased. Apparently, then, the utilitarian would say that the Catholic Church acted immorally in reliving Charamsa of his priesthood, though for completely different reasons than those most people would give.
Immanuel Kant contrasts with Mill in that he believes that certain actions are intrinsically moral or immoral, regardless of their consequences. That is to say, a certain course of action may actually produce great suffering for the greatest number of people, and yet still be the moral action. Kant’s ethical theory revolves around one central thesis: one ought to act only insofar as everyone in similar circumstances could consistently carry out his action. This is a somewhat clumsy statement of the categorical imperative. From this general principle, Kant derives the principle of human dignity: one ought to act only so that she treats other people as ends in themselves. As St. Augustine said, we are to use things and love people. For this reason, it seems clear that Kant would answer our first question affirmatively: people do have the right to sexual freedom.
To our second question, Kant’s answer is complicated. Looking closely at the categorical imperative, let us ask ourselves a question: what would happen if everyone disregarded the proscriptions that come with being a member of an organization? If Catholic priests, for instance, disobeyed the Church in every way (by having sex, teaching their particular beliefs as opposed to orthodoxy, and so forth), what would happen? In that case, the Church would have no authority whatsoever and would cease to be anything at all. It would appear, therefore, that disobedience to an agreed-upon authority cannot be consistently willed (the phrase agreed-upon is key here for drawing out the contradiction). In short, Charamsa’s actions violate the categorical imperative and are therefore immoral. However, how can Kant consistently say that people have a right to sexual freedom and yet an authority can restrict that right? The answer is that people willingly submit themselves to the authority of an organization or group and therefore willingly give up the right in question. This should be particularly clear in the case of the Catholic Church. That is Kant’s argument, at least, and now we turn to evaluate Kant and Mill.
At the outset, it is important to remember that emotions play no role in a rational assessment of the Church’s actions. We must approach that assessment with objectivity and disinterest, hoping to get at the truth rather than a confirmation of what we already believed to be true. With that in mind, I offer my thoughts. Recall that the two question before us are (1) Do we have a right to sexual freedom?, and (2) Can that right ever be overridden?.
With respect to (1), I do believe we have a right to sexual freedom. Mill’s justification is doubtless faulty because all he can justify is treating people as if they had rights; he cannot actually ground real human rights. Moreover, people still have rights even if there are bad consequences of respecting those rights. Kant’s conclusion fairs well with our moral intuitions, so I must declare him the winner. I would ground human rights, not only in the categorical imperative, but also in the intrinsic worth of every human being.
However, a qualifier is important here. We do not have the right, for instance, to indulge in our sexual fantasies if they involve harm to others (rape, violence, etc.). Moreover, we arguably do not have the right to lifestyles that harm ourselves. We do not have the right, for instance, to destroy ourselves with drugs, to submit ourselves to sexually transmitted infections, and to harm in any way our bodies during sexual intercourse. These qualifications are relevant to the case at hand because some moral philosophers have argued against a homosexual lifestyle on just these grounds. They have cited various medical studies that indicate the life threatening nature of homosexual intercourse. If these arguments are valid, the conclusion appears to be that we do not have the right to a homosexual lifestyle. However, I have never personally investigated these medical studies, and so must withhold judgement. Operating under the assumption that no factors might override our right to sexual freedom, I must answer the first question affirmatively.
Regarding (2), it seems to me that various things might override a right to sexual freedom. It seems to me that willingly signing the right away does the trick. When Charamsa, for instance, became a priest in the Catholic Church, he willingly agreed not to engage in homosexual behavior. More generally, he agreed to teach Catholic doctrine and to act in accordance with those teachings. The Church did not force him to be a priest, after all. It seems to me entirely inappropriate for him to openly contradict the Church, as he is still a member of that Church. The mature and respectable course of action, I think, would have been for him to renounce his priesthood and then declared his lifestyle to the public. No one can force Charamsa to live a certain lifestyle. However, for him to agree to live a certain way and then openly refuse to do so, is merely for him to fail to be a man of his word. Furthermore, I find Kant’s appeal to the categorical imperative convincing. If everyone were to break their vows to an organization, vows would be meaningless indeed.
To end our discussion, we all have the right to live our lives as we choose. However, we do not have the right to break our vows. Let us strive to be people of our word, and to maintain personal integrity in all that we do.
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