Maintaining Peace after World War I

Prompt: Evaluate the successes and failures of peacekeeping after the First World War.

 

Cynically speaking – and perhaps realistically speaking as well – peace is an impossible dream, defying all attempts to achieve it. In the case of world affairs following World War I (WWI), peacekeeping was not a successful undertaking. In particular, the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations, and Wilson’s Fourteen Points all failed to achieve peace between nations.

 

Turn first to the Treaty of Versailles, a veritable failure at establishing world peace. Under the treaty, for instance, Germany had to cash out 132 billion gold marks in reparations. This debt led to the spread of propaganda throughout Germany (proclamations of the unfairness of the Versailles treaty). Hitler was therefore able to gain political power in Germany by standing tall on the platform of ignoring the treaty. Moreover, the war guilt clause – that part of the treaty that blamed Germany for the outbreak of WWI – deeply hurt German pride and left them aghast. It was in this feeling of bitterness and humiliation that Hitler, with his emphasis on German nationalism, gains popular support. Finally, the creation of Poland, a provision of the treaty, was a thorn in Germany’s side because its creation split Germany in two geographical pieces. This implication partly explains why Hitler invaded Poland in 1939 (thus beginning World War II). In these three ways, the Treaty of Versailles fostered German resentment and indirectly led to World War II. In a broad sense, then, the treaty failed to maintain peace.

The League of Nations in particular – a provision of the Versailles treaty – failed to establish world peace as well. For example, the League lacked the power of economic sanction because Congress banned the United States from entering the League. With the United States still a viable market for any sanctioned nation, sanctions could not significantly affect any nations’ economy. Further, the League could not enforce its decisions with military action. Any member nation could therefore ignore those decisions with almost no consequences, which did in fact happen in at least two cases. First, in 1920-23, the League was unable to stop Poland from taking Vilna from Lithuania. Second, in 1923, Greek soldiers shot Italian army men, and Italy occupied Corfu in response. They refused to leave until compensation was paid, and ignored the League throughout. Finally, the Ruhr crisis (1923) stands out as a particularly vivid failure. When Germany declared bankruptcy and refused to pay French reparations, France occupied several German factories. The United States managed to work out a deal between the two nations, essentially loaning money to Germany via the Dawes Plan. The League, however, did nothing to resolve the crisis. In short, the League of Nations was powerless to maintain peace in the aftermath of WWI.

 

Like the League, Wilson’s entire Fourteen Point Peace Plan failed in its objectives. It failed to achieve self-determination, or political independence, for ethnic minorities. In Czechoslovakia alone, Czechs, Poles, Magyars, Ruthenians, and Germans lived side by side. Moreover, Wilson’s plan agitated French/German relations by giving Alsace-Loraine back to France. Two factors caused this reaction. First, many ethnic Germans lived within the territory. Returning it to France caused considerable local conflict. Second, Germans thought of the territory as part of Germany, seeing as it was part of the empire for over fifty years (gained in 1871). Finally, the rise of Mussolini and his Italian dictatorship was directly caused by Wilson’s failure to implement one of his fourteen points; namely, point nine, which basically promised that land be given to Italy. When the Allies failed to give this land to Italy, Italy felt betrayed. It was in this climate that Mussolini rose to power and later engaged in World War II. In these three ways, the Peace Plan did nothing by way of establishing peace.

 

However, some historians disagree. Some argue that the League of Nations did maintain peace; in particular, in the cases of Aland Islands and Mosul. Others point out that the United States was in fact able to keep the peace during the Ruhr crisis, as outlined above. Finally, some point out that no military conflicts actually arose between ethnic minorities in newly created nations (e.g., Poland, Latvia, Finland, etc.), the implication being that peace keeping was successful to some extent.

 

It is easy to answer these objections. With respect to the first objection, I grant the point. We should say, then, that efforts at long-term peace failed, even if there were short-term successes. As for the Ruhr crisis, this is only a short-term success because in 1940, Hitler invaded France. Finally, regarding the absence of military conflicts, peacekeeping involves more than preventing military action; it encompasses prevention of hate crimes, skirmishes, and gang violence as well. No one prevented these things in any newly created nation following WWI. Indeed, the Treaty of Versailles’ drawing national borders without regard to ethnic lines caused them. In conclusion, efforts at long-term peacekeeping failed in the aftermath of WWI.