Martin Shkreli - Evil Monster or Balanced Utilitarian?
A United States drug company – Turing Pharmaceuticals – recently raised the price of AIDS medication by over five thousand percent, having bought the rights to the drug in August. Following public outcry, Turing promised to reduce the price, though not specifying the exact reduction. The ostensible justification for their previous move from $13.50 a pill to $750 was to use that increased profit for medical research. Martin Shkreli, the head of the company, says that his critics do not understand the pharmaceutical industry, implying that his company’s actions were not immoral or selfish, but balanced and prudent.
Public outcry against Turing Pharmaceuticals stems from the fact that many, many people suffering from AIDS cannot afford the newly priced medication. There the medication is, right before their eyes, and yet they must waste away to their disease because they are not millionaires. Most people believe that we have a moral duty to help others in their distress when it is within our power to do so, and raising the price of AIDS medication by an order of magnitude seems to violate that duty. The ethical question before us, then, is this: do people have a moral duty to alleviate the suffering of others when it is in their capacity to do so? Alternatively, do I only have an obligation to myself?
Two philosophers present contrary answers. Philosopher James Rachels would apply ethical egoism – the view that I ought to act only in my self-interest – to the question at hand. According to Rachels, if it is in the best interest of Shkreli not to lessen the suffering of others, then not only is it morally permissible to do so, he is morally obligated to do so. Given that Shkreli would probably benefit enormously from increased profits, it follows that he ought to raise the price of AIDS medication.
John Stuart Mill, a utilitarian, would answer the question differently. According to him, if helping others increases the total net good for the greatest number of people, then it is morally obligatory to do so. While in general it is clear that we all benefit when everyone is working together, it seems the utilitarian might argue in this specific case that increased prices might eventually work out for the greatest good for the greatest number. Given that the extra profit goes towards medical research that might find new and better cures for ailments, everyone would benefit – eventually, that is. Therefore, Mill would probably condone Shkreli’s actions. Notice that although Rachels and Mill come to the same conclusion, they do so for entirely different reasons: for Rachels, the individual matters, while for Mill, it is the whole of humanity.
In my humble opinion, both philosophers are mistaken. First, egoism and utilitarianism are subject to serious objections. Some argue, for instance, that egoism is inconsistent with genuine love - and yet love is part of the moral life. You love someone, not because you receive some benefit by doing so, but simply because you want him or her to feel loved. Ethical egoism cannot make sense of such love. Moreover, utilitarianism fails because we are not in a good position to determine the long-term consequences of any action whatsoever. It may be the case that in the short term, some action x produces the greatest good for the greatest number, and yet in the long term, x redounds to the greatest suffering for the greatest number. Given our limits in space and time, we cannot determine the ultimate consequences of our actions. In short, utilitarianism fails as an ethical theory because it cannot tell us how to live.
Second, a deontological theory of ethics suggests that it is morally obligatory to alleviate the suffering of others when it is within our power to do so, period. It seems to me that we know on a very basic level that we ought to help others; we ought to end another’s pain, whenever and wherever we can. Moreover, we know that this is so regardless of the consequences of doing it, and regardless of the benefit that I accrue by doing it - the act is intrinsically right, irrespective of anything else. Now if we are morally obligated to alleviate the suffering of others, it would seem to follow that Turing Pharmaceuticals should not increase the price of AIDS medication, because doing so would contradict just that moral duty. This conclusion satisfies my moral intuitions, at least, and I think most people would agree.
Public outcry against Turing Pharmaceuticals stems from the fact that many, many people suffering from AIDS cannot afford the newly priced medication. There the medication is, right before their eyes, and yet they must waste away to their disease because they are not millionaires. Most people believe that we have a moral duty to help others in their distress when it is within our power to do so, and raising the price of AIDS medication by an order of magnitude seems to violate that duty. The ethical question before us, then, is this: do people have a moral duty to alleviate the suffering of others when it is in their capacity to do so? Alternatively, do I only have an obligation to myself?
Two philosophers present contrary answers. Philosopher James Rachels would apply ethical egoism – the view that I ought to act only in my self-interest – to the question at hand. According to Rachels, if it is in the best interest of Shkreli not to lessen the suffering of others, then not only is it morally permissible to do so, he is morally obligated to do so. Given that Shkreli would probably benefit enormously from increased profits, it follows that he ought to raise the price of AIDS medication.
John Stuart Mill, a utilitarian, would answer the question differently. According to him, if helping others increases the total net good for the greatest number of people, then it is morally obligatory to do so. While in general it is clear that we all benefit when everyone is working together, it seems the utilitarian might argue in this specific case that increased prices might eventually work out for the greatest good for the greatest number. Given that the extra profit goes towards medical research that might find new and better cures for ailments, everyone would benefit – eventually, that is. Therefore, Mill would probably condone Shkreli’s actions. Notice that although Rachels and Mill come to the same conclusion, they do so for entirely different reasons: for Rachels, the individual matters, while for Mill, it is the whole of humanity.
In my humble opinion, both philosophers are mistaken. First, egoism and utilitarianism are subject to serious objections. Some argue, for instance, that egoism is inconsistent with genuine love - and yet love is part of the moral life. You love someone, not because you receive some benefit by doing so, but simply because you want him or her to feel loved. Ethical egoism cannot make sense of such love. Moreover, utilitarianism fails because we are not in a good position to determine the long-term consequences of any action whatsoever. It may be the case that in the short term, some action x produces the greatest good for the greatest number, and yet in the long term, x redounds to the greatest suffering for the greatest number. Given our limits in space and time, we cannot determine the ultimate consequences of our actions. In short, utilitarianism fails as an ethical theory because it cannot tell us how to live.
Second, a deontological theory of ethics suggests that it is morally obligatory to alleviate the suffering of others when it is within our power to do so, period. It seems to me that we know on a very basic level that we ought to help others; we ought to end another’s pain, whenever and wherever we can. Moreover, we know that this is so regardless of the consequences of doing it, and regardless of the benefit that I accrue by doing it - the act is intrinsically right, irrespective of anything else. Now if we are morally obligated to alleviate the suffering of others, it would seem to follow that Turing Pharmaceuticals should not increase the price of AIDS medication, because doing so would contradict just that moral duty. This conclusion satisfies my moral intuitions, at least, and I think most people would agree.
I mostly agree. But I also want to point out that most arguments around this sort of thing fail to really follow through to examine secondary, tertiary, ... consequences of either decision and often come to wrong or at least questionable conclusions solely through an unwillingness to deal with the complexity of the issue.
ReplyDeleteThere's another question that comes up here. We have established a system in this country which brings investors into ventures by promising them profit. I don't know the backstory here, but I'm guessing that at some point Shkreli invested money in Turing on the basis of a chance at a financial return. In this case, it's wrong to attack Shkreli for following through on the very purpose for which he invested - we have to step back and ask whether we condone the *system* we have constructed for pharmaceuticals. This is the other unbelievably frequent fallacy: blaming the individual for acting in alignment with the system instead of examining and considering changing the system. This fallacy appears in the news with depressing regularity.
I do think an examination of the immediate consequences of an act is important in determining what we ought to do. However, I am not a utilitarian; I do not think that consequences alone determine the morality of an action. Even if all the primary, secondary, and tertiary consequences of an act are known, that by itself would not tell us what we ought to do. In any case, remember my criticism of utilitarianism above: we are not in a position to judge the long-term consequences of our actions. This should be even more clear in the case of secondary and tertiary consequences: the complexity of the world and human interaction is such that determining those consequences is pure speculation.
ReplyDeleteAs for blaming Shkreli himself, I'm of two minds here. On the one hand, I feel the force of your point - we ought to blame the system that Shkreli played a part in, not Shkreli himself. He was a product of his environment, so to speak, and he simply did what everyone one else in his position does. In this way, the title of my paper is a false dichotomy. On the other hand, I think one can consistently blame Shkreli AND seek to change the system. We are all accountable for our actions, and I do not think it's fair to overlook Shkreli's choices simply because he was acting in accord with the pharmaceutical industry. The system may be broken, but we can still choose whether or not to play. And with that in mind, we can seek to reform the pharmaceutical industry so that future generations do not have to face the moral dilemma that Shkreli faced.
Hey, Miles, on the run this week - have to fly to Oakland for a conference tomorrow - so no time to respond more fully. Will try next week after Dad and Bev leave. But did just see this article to the system point: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/09/25/the-drug-industry-wants-us-to-think-martin-shkreli-is-a-rogue-ceo-he-isnt/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_wonk
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