God is the Source of Morality?: Three Objections
Abstract: I love discussing philosophy and religion on online forums. Not only is it an opportunity to develop my communication skills, but it helps me to see how far I've come in my studies. I recently discussed the moral argument for the existence of God with someone who had (what they took to be) some serious objections. Below is my interlocutor's post, and my response.
Written: June 2015.
Keep in mind that it's not Craig's view of atheistic moral objectivism that I find coherent, I'm just convinced that Theism (or Christianity) don't coherently allow for moral absolutes. In my mind, at least as it stands right now, I believe that moral absolutes exist, but it's only from moral experience. This doesn't put me in a good position, because the atheist can say the same thing.
Please only answer of you think you can give a coherent and logically sound answer. I really do know that God exists, but lately it's been turning into more of a holy spirit filled faith than an intellectually defendable one.
This being said, I have three reasons that I feel I can't endorse the moral argument.
1. The modern Euthyphro Dilemma - Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it's good?
Is it a false dilemma? Then question gets pushed back another step. Saying things like "God's nature is good" or "God is the good" is still subscribing to the second horn of the dilemma. Of any "x" where "x" is a moral standard, you could ask "Is something good because x says it is, or does x say it is because it is good?". From this, you're right back to the start.
Is it good because it could not be any other way? Then it is arbitrary, and there is no inherent goodness that manifests itself in metaphysical necessity (many Ontological Argument proponents say that because God is a metaphysical ultimate or, the greatest conceivable being, then be must be the paradigm of virtue and moral goodness).
Is it because it's good (first horn). Then we don't need God for morals, and instead of pushing the dilemma one step forward, we just push it one step backward toward this "standard" that God uses, and it too becomes arbitrary.
2. Moral values need a moral valuer - Platonism says that things like Goodness and Justice are just concepts, and some Platonists would say that this makes them good. The problem with this is that a concept that just is is arbitrary in it's own sense. Surely there has to be some reason that these abstract-ish objects ought to be the paradigm of moral virtue? With this being said, how about the other alternative. You need to have a mind of some sort, even if it's an umembodied mind, to give reason, non-arbitrarity, and sense to the moral concepts. Most people say this could be God. But then the other arbitrarity comes as an inescapable product of a value being valued by a mind: the moral value that was valued needs a valuer and therefore, the moral value is only "true" to the person that values it. Why is this any different than what the New Atheists are doing? They say that they value something and try to push it on others, because in some way it's supposed to be objective. Just because you, me, or God values something doesn't mean it's objective in any sense. Why should it be?
3. The Evil god Hypothesis - Watch the Craig-Law debate if you don't know this one. Law says this cannot prove the existence of a good god, because the greatest evil an evil god could produce could be to balance suffering with happiness to enhance the suffering. Craig responds by backing out of one of his previous claims, that goodness is a trait that is derived from with argument, if sound, and instead just agrees with Law, that it proves God exists if sound, but not that a good God exists.
[1] Craig points this out in response to a similar objection from Walter-Sinnott Armstrong. See: Is Goodness Without God Good Enough?, 173.
[2] See Craig's response: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-evil-god-objection.
[3] Ibid.
Written: June 2015.
Objections - Hey guys, where I'm at right now I don't endorse the moral argument. Because of this debate between William Lane Craig and Stephen Law (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w7FhphWDokA) I believe that Craig's best-outreaching argument based on moral absolutes is isn't sound. Law brought up good points, and because of his objections, (not to mention Craig saying other places that we can say that God's goodness is also established in the moral argument that then flatly denying it here) have led me to believe that the moral argument isn't sound. I really want to be able to endorse it but I can't.
Keep in mind that it's not Craig's view of atheistic moral objectivism that I find coherent, I'm just convinced that Theism (or Christianity) don't coherently allow for moral absolutes. In my mind, at least as it stands right now, I believe that moral absolutes exist, but it's only from moral experience. This doesn't put me in a good position, because the atheist can say the same thing.
Please only answer of you think you can give a coherent and logically sound answer. I really do know that God exists, but lately it's been turning into more of a holy spirit filled faith than an intellectually defendable one.
This being said, I have three reasons that I feel I can't endorse the moral argument.
1. The modern Euthyphro Dilemma - Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it's good?
Is it a false dilemma? Then question gets pushed back another step. Saying things like "God's nature is good" or "God is the good" is still subscribing to the second horn of the dilemma. Of any "x" where "x" is a moral standard, you could ask "Is something good because x says it is, or does x say it is because it is good?". From this, you're right back to the start.
Is it good because it could not be any other way? Then it is arbitrary, and there is no inherent goodness that manifests itself in metaphysical necessity (many Ontological Argument proponents say that because God is a metaphysical ultimate or, the greatest conceivable being, then be must be the paradigm of virtue and moral goodness).
Is it because it's good (first horn). Then we don't need God for morals, and instead of pushing the dilemma one step forward, we just push it one step backward toward this "standard" that God uses, and it too becomes arbitrary.
2. Moral values need a moral valuer - Platonism says that things like Goodness and Justice are just concepts, and some Platonists would say that this makes them good. The problem with this is that a concept that just is is arbitrary in it's own sense. Surely there has to be some reason that these abstract-ish objects ought to be the paradigm of moral virtue? With this being said, how about the other alternative. You need to have a mind of some sort, even if it's an umembodied mind, to give reason, non-arbitrarity, and sense to the moral concepts. Most people say this could be God. But then the other arbitrarity comes as an inescapable product of a value being valued by a mind: the moral value that was valued needs a valuer and therefore, the moral value is only "true" to the person that values it. Why is this any different than what the New Atheists are doing? They say that they value something and try to push it on others, because in some way it's supposed to be objective. Just because you, me, or God values something doesn't mean it's objective in any sense. Why should it be?
3. The Evil god Hypothesis - Watch the Craig-Law debate if you don't know this one. Law says this cannot prove the existence of a good god, because the greatest evil an evil god could produce could be to balance suffering with happiness to enhance the suffering. Craig responds by backing out of one of his previous claims, that goodness is a trait that is derived from with argument, if sound, and instead just agrees with Law, that it proves God exists if sound, but not that a good God exists.
My Response - I am glad you are open to discussion, because I can give you "a coherent and logically sound" response. But let us be clear about what the moral argument actually claims.
- If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
- Objective moral values and duties exist.
- Therefore, God exists.
- Some moral value, X, is good because God thinks that X is good.
with the true claim that,
- X is good because God is X.
Craig asserts the latter, not the former; God’s opinion has nothing to do with it. So I agree with you when you say that just “because you, me, or God values something doesn't mean it's objective in any sense.” That is not, after all, what premise (1) asserts. Second, moral duties (e.g., "Thou shalt not kill", "Thou shalt not steal", etc.) are grounded in God's commands. These commands are not arbitrary, because they are necessary reflections of God's good character. Therefore, God could not have commanded that rape be permissible, that torture be good, and the like. So the right and the good are neither arbitrary nor independent of God. The Euthyphro dilemma fails.
Related to Euthyphro considerations, you claim that it is arbitrary to adopt God's nature as definitive of moral value. What you seem to be arguing is that just as it is arbitrary to claim that abstract objects ground moral values, so too it is arbitrary to adopt God's nature as such a ground. This objection, however, confuses arbitrariness with being an explanatory stopping point. [1] All moral theories (whether theistic, atheistic, or Platonistic) have to come to an end in their explanation of morality, and God is the most plausible stopping point. God, after all, is the greatest conceivable being, and it is greater to be the very standard of moral value rather than merely conforming to some external standard. Therefore, God is plausibly taken as the foundation of value, and it is not arbitrary to take His character as that foundation. It is just to admit that there is no further explanation.
Your third qualm with the moral argument is "the Evil God" objection. This is by far the weakest objection of the three, and isn't even an objection to the moral argument. [2]Craig adequately addresses 'the Evil God' hypothesis when he writes: "Law mistakenly seems to think that the theist arrives at the conclusion that [God] is good by an inductive survey of the world’s events. Seeing all the goods in the world, the theist supposedly infers that [God] is...good. That assumption is simply incorrect." [3] Theists have never argued that when we look out into the world, we see good things, and therefore there must be a good God to explain them. They have, rather, presented the moral argument, and the moral argument is not an appeal to a survey of the good in the world. The moral argument, after all, can be presented in the following form:
In conclusion, I do not think your objections are insuperable or even persuasive. The moral argument emerges unscathed.
Related to Euthyphro considerations, you claim that it is arbitrary to adopt God's nature as definitive of moral value. What you seem to be arguing is that just as it is arbitrary to claim that abstract objects ground moral values, so too it is arbitrary to adopt God's nature as such a ground. This objection, however, confuses arbitrariness with being an explanatory stopping point. [1] All moral theories (whether theistic, atheistic, or Platonistic) have to come to an end in their explanation of morality, and God is the most plausible stopping point. God, after all, is the greatest conceivable being, and it is greater to be the very standard of moral value rather than merely conforming to some external standard. Therefore, God is plausibly taken as the foundation of value, and it is not arbitrary to take His character as that foundation. It is just to admit that there is no further explanation.
Your third qualm with the moral argument is "the Evil God" objection. This is by far the weakest objection of the three, and isn't even an objection to the moral argument. [2]Craig adequately addresses 'the Evil God' hypothesis when he writes: "Law mistakenly seems to think that the theist arrives at the conclusion that [God] is good by an inductive survey of the world’s events. Seeing all the goods in the world, the theist supposedly infers that [God] is...good. That assumption is simply incorrect." [3] Theists have never argued that when we look out into the world, we see good things, and therefore there must be a good God to explain them. They have, rather, presented the moral argument, and the moral argument is not an appeal to a survey of the good in the world. The moral argument, after all, can be presented in the following form:
- If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
- Objective evil exists.
- Therefore, objective moral values exist. (Some things are evil!)
- Therefore, God exists.
In conclusion, I do not think your objections are insuperable or even persuasive. The moral argument emerges unscathed.
Notes
[1] Craig points this out in response to a similar objection from Walter-Sinnott Armstrong. See: Is Goodness Without God Good Enough?, 173.
[2] See Craig's response: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-evil-god-objection.
[3] Ibid.
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