Moral Progress: An Argument for God?

Background Information - Philosopher William Lane Craig has developed and defended an argument for the existence of God based on moral considerations. He argues that God is the best explanation for objective moral values and duties. To say that some value or duty is objective is to say that it is valid and binding whether or not anyone believes it to be so. For example, to say that murder is objectively wrong is to say that it is wrong to murder someone, whether or not anyone actually thinks that it is; the wrongness of murder is independent of opinion. Craig maintains that if God does not exist, moral values and duties cannot be objective in this sense. If we think that there are objective values and duties, then we will conclude that God exists.

This information is relevant to a recent discussion I had on an online forum [1]. J. D. Schoone argues that moral progress provides grounds for thinking that objective moral values exist, and that this in turn implies that reality is not wholly physical. Moral progress is the idea that, when we look at the history of various societies, they have generally progressed in their moral outlooks. Germany has moved out of Nazi ideology, and the United States has moved past slavery and later racial segregation. In short, societies are getting better. Schoone and I discuss the implications of this fact.

Written - April 2015.

Schoone - I will be presenting a paper in about a month concerning an argument I developed based on the existence of moral progress. I will present this paper during a conference concerning moral progress, and my particular argument deals with the ontological commitment one must make in order to believe in the existence of moral progress. I will post a summary of the argument here. Critical comments are very welcome.

1. If there is moral progress, then there has to be an objective moral standard.
2. If there is an objective moral standard, then one has to accept immaterial entities in ones ontology.
3. There is moral progress.
4. One has to accept immaterial entities in ones ontology.

Premise (1) - Moral progress is the idea that we are striving towards a (morally) better world. For instance, slavery used to be permitted in many countries, but has since been abolished. This constitutes moral progress. However, it seems to me that this implies some kind of objective moral standard or measurement. For why would abolishing slavery be better than keeping slaves? If morality is subjective then it would be impossible to hold to the notion of moral progress, not even within ones own culture, let alone globally. Therefore, if one genuinely believes in moral progress, one is committed to the existence of objective moral facts about the world, such as 'slavery is wrong'.

Premise (2) - This premise is basically a take on philosopher William Lane Craig's moral argument. If objective moral facts exists then one has to ask in what way these can exist. I argue for a broader view than Craig: I agree with him that moral facts are immaterial (for it seems impossible for there to be some kind of material (physical) standard of morality) but that still leaves open the possibility of Platonism being true.

Premise (3) - The difference between Craig's argument and mine is that Craig is trying to show directly that moral facts exist. I am taking another route. It seems to me that many people, atheists and theists alike, believe in the truth of premise 3. Things like the abolishment of slavery, but also the rise of equal rights/human rights seems to indicate that many believe our current world to have morally progressed. If one disagrees with that, then one must also disagree with the statement that a world without slavery is better than a world with slavery. I don't think many people will hold to that position. Therefore, believing in moral progress seems preferable to not believing in moral progress.

Premise (4) - The conclusion follows from the three premises. This is not an argument for the existence of God, but it is an argument against moral relativism and against ontological naturalism. To me this argument appears valid and sound, but as I said, I more than welcome criticism since I expect that not everyone is happy with this conclusion. But to avoid the conclusion one has to disagree with one of the premises and I wonder which premises are open to such criticism.

Thanks for your help!

Donahue - Interesting comments! I too am attracted to an argument for objective moral truth from moral progress. Nevertheless, I want to maintain the tight connection between God and morality seen in Craig’s argument. I will suggest that, even though your argument is valid and its premises true, it is not a meaningful reformulation of Craig’s version. I hope you find my critical interaction stimulating and helpful.

The argument, as you state it, boils down to the following: [2]

1. If there is moral progress, then there is an objective moral standard (i.e., objective moral values and duties).
2. If there is an objective moral standard, then immaterial entities exist.
3. There is moral progress.
4. Therefore, immaterial entities exist.

The argument is logically airtight, so the question is, what reasons are there for thinking that (1), (2), and (3) are true? 

Turn first to premise (1). I take (1) as obviously true. If there is no objective, culturally independent moral framework by which to judge the various moral systems of the world, the idea of "moral progress" makes no sense. To say that some culture has morally improved is to say that its values more closely align with an objective moral standard than they once did. But if we deny that such a standard exists, what does it mean to say that some society has morally improved? Because there is no independent set of moral truths (i.e., that which is definitive of goodness) by which to judge a culture’s moral history, we could speak of moral change, but not of moral improvement. [3]

Secondly, premise (2) is rather ambiguous. As I read you, (2) should be worded more like,

2'. If there is an objective moral standard, then independent, immaterial moral values exist.

This is what Platonism teaches. Premise (2’) is an important correction because someone could reject (2') but still accept (2). They could hold, as Dr. Craig does, that the existence of moral values is best explained by the existence of God, the ultimate immaterial entity. On this interpretation, the reason moral values imply that immaterial realities exist is not because values themselves must exist as independent, abstract objects, but rather because they require the existence of an immaterial God. But that is not what you are arguing. Rather, you support the Platonist position, seeing moral values as independently existing abstract objects. Thus, premise (2').

But why think (2') is true? Why could we not say that moral values are reflections of the character of God, rather than independent, abstract objects? But in point of fact, all you are contending is "the possibility of Platonism being true." But if it is just the possibility of Platonism you are after, very few philosophers would disagree. The mere possibility that (2') is true is no reason to think that it actually is. If you want to argue for that conclusion, you need to give us some reason to think that Platonism is more plausibly true than some form of theistic ethics. Otherwise, we must simply remain agnostic.

On the contrary, Craig presents two objections to a Platonist theory of morality. [4] First, Platonism appears unintelligible. Take the moral value of Justice, for example. I understand what it means to say that a person is just, or that some action is just. I do not understand, however, what it means to say that Justice itself exists, in the absence of persons or actions. Moreover, according to Platonism, moral values would not actually be what they are, strange as that may sound. Justice would not be just, Love would not be loving, and Grace would not be gracious. They are all just abstract, immaterial things incapable of acting in a just, loving, or gracious way. Justice, Love, and Grace cannot be just, loving, or gracious any more than the number seven, or the idea of an apple. [5] For these two reasons, Platonism's understanding of moral value is unintelligible. By contrast, it is perfectly intelligible to say that values are reflections of God’s character.

Second, Platonism cannot explain moral duties. Moral values (e.g., justice, love, respect, and kindness) concern something's worth, while moral duties (e.g., "Do not kill", "Do not steal", "Love others as yourself", etc.) concern something's obligatoriness. Even if it is morally good for me to become a doctor, it is also morally good for me to become a teacher. Therefore, I do not have a moral duty to do either. So duties and values are not the same thing, and yet both are equally significant realities. Let us suppose there are immaterial objects like Love, Justice, Generosity, and so forth. The question remains, from where arise my moral duties? Who or what lays these obligations upon my life? Values alone do not suffice, as the doctor/teacher example illustrates. Further, Platonism must admit that, in addition to virtues, vices (e.g., Hate, Intolerance, and Injustice) exist as abstract objects as well. What requires me to conform my life to the virtuous set of moral abstracta rather than the vices? According to Platonism, there is no person who might act as the source of those obligations, while there is such a Person according to theistic ethics.

In short, a theistic understanding of moral values and duties is preferable to Platonism, given that (1) theistic ethics offers an intelligible account of moral value, and (2) it can account for moral duty, whereas Platonism can do neither.

Finally, premise (3) is quite plausible. But let me raise a concern with its worth as an argument for objective moral truth. Instead of arguing directly for objective moral values and duties, one argues indirectly for their reality by means of objective moral progress. This latter notion in turn depends necessarily on the existence of an objective moral standard, so by arguing for the latter, one supports the former. But we must ask ourselves, why think that (3) is true? I am inclined to say the answer just is the reasons given to think that objective values and duties exist. We experience a moral realm and apprehend the actions of various cultures across time with reference to that realm. From this experience, we see that some cultures are morally improving while others are not. In the absence of any reason to think that our experience is delusory, we are rational in accepting what it tells us. But this is the exact same reasoning used to argue directly for the existence of an objective moral standard! In essence, no advantage is gained by arguing for moral truths indirectly via moral progress rather than “trying to show directly that moral facts exist,” so we might as well cut out the middle man and go straight after our goal.

I would say, however, that for those who are already convinced that moral progress takes place, pointing out that moral improvement depends necessarily on an independent moral standard gives such a person powerful reason to believe in objective values and duties. But if someone is not already convinced, nothing is gained by arguing for moral progress instead of just directly addressing the question of moral truth. That being said, I appreciate that the conference you will be participating in is about moral progress, so that should still be the central focus of your argument.

Perhaps a good recasting of your argument that preserves its original goals, but also incorporates the above considerations, would look something like this:

1. If there is objective moral progress, then an objective moral standard exists.
2. If an objective moral standard exists, then God exists.
3. If God exists, then an immaterial entity exists.
4. There is moral progress.
5. Therefore, an objective moral standard exists (from 1 and 4).
6. Therefore, God exists (from 2 and 5).
7. Therefore, an immaterial entity exists (from 3 and 6).

It maintains the original objective of demonstrating that materialism is false. Moreover, its central focus remains the reality of moral progress, and so is still an indirect argument for objective moral truth. Finally, it recognizes the connection between God and morality, a point lacking in your original formulation.

Well, I have certainly enjoyed myself interacting with your proposal, so thank you!

Schoone - Thank you for your comments. They are helpful indeed. Since I agree with most of what you have stated I won't quote your whole post. But let me make two comments.

1. My thought was, as you correctly described, to conclude that objective moral values and duties exist by starting from the existence of moral progress, which (especially considering the earlier mentioned conference theme) might make a better case for the existence of at least one immaterial entity than directly going to objective moral values and duties would do.

2. I want to construct this argument in such a way that it includes both the believe that the immaterial entity involved is God, and the believe that the immaterial entity or entities could be Platonic ideas. The reason for doing that is simply because I don't want to get tangled up into a discussion concerning whether this is a proof for the existence of God, or why I don't include Platonism. Your comments concerning Platonism are obviously spot on but I think we can let those arguments rest. Even without them it seems clear that if one wishes to speak coherently about the concept of moral progress, then one has to admit at least one immaterial entity in ones ontology. I think that conclusion is, for the purpose of this paper, sufficient (and obviously highly problematic for any materialist).

Notes

[1] http://www.reasonablefaith.org/forums/moral-argument/argument-moral-progress-6030025.0.html

[2] I have stripped away some unnecessary vocabulary (e.g., “one has to accept”, “one’s ontology”, and so forth).

[3] Craig has made this same point in his various debates, though I do not know the exact citations.

[4] William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 178-179.

[5] Platonism entails that numbers are just as immaterial, abstract, and impersonal as values; they are of the same substance. Therefore, it seems that whatever moral properties apply to the former apply to the latter.