Couldn't They All Be True?: A Reflection on World Religions

Written: February 2015

Abstract: There is no surer way to start an argument or end a friendship than by bringing up religion. Religion speaks to the deepest needs of the human heart, so a natural defensiveness results when others question one’s own religious afflictions. Moreover, religion is taken to be a subjective phenomenon, leading to the common belief that all religions are equally true.  It is argued that this under-standing of the nature of religion, and the resulting implication, is fundamentally mistaken. The paper ends with a consideration of how people might come to know which of the world’s many religious traditions is true.

I. Introduction

In the face of the world’s manifold and diverse religions, it is not easy to maintain the belief that one’s own religion is true, and that the rest of the world is wrong. And even if one could maintain such a belief, it is next to impossible to voice that belief. Such words bring indignation, division, and hurt. But why? As I will argue in Sections II and III, these emotions spring from a mistaken understanding of the nature of religious belief. From this mistaken understanding also springs the common wisdom that all religions are equally valid or true in their own way. Your worldview is true for you, and my worldview is true for me. Anyone who refuses to accept that everyone’s views are equally valid is branded as “intolerant” and comes under intense anger and, ironically, intolerance. It is my contention that the “common wisdom” is fundamentally mistaken.[1]  In Section III, I contend that religions attempt to capture the way the world really is; they attempt to give the objective truth about the universe and humanity. In Section IV, I argue that if world religions present different understandings of the nature of reality, then they cannot all be true. Accordingly, in Section V, I argue that they do indeed present different, and indeed inconsistent, answers to the deepest questions of life. In Section VI, I end with a consideration of how we as rational human begins might come to know which religion, if any, is true.

II. Preliminary Definitions

Today, it is the height of arrogance to claim that one’s own religion is true, and all others false. This is a view known as religious exclusivism. On the other hand, the idea that all religions are in some sense true is known as religious pluralism, a view that founds itself on a certain understanding of tolerance.[2]  Philosophers William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland distinguish two senses of what it means to be tolerant. According to the classic principle of tolerance, “a person holds that his own…views are true and those of his opponent false. But he still respects his [opponent‘s] …right to make a case for his views.”[3]  The modern principle of tolerance, however, claims “that one should not even judge other people’s viewpoints as wrong.”[4] The traditional view presupposes that people have genuine disagreements, and proscribes how they are to act towards one another in light of that fact; the modern view tries to dissolve those disagreements away completely. Religious pluralism founds itself upon the latter sense of tolerance.

But that does not yet answer the question of why religious exclusivism is reacted to with so much indignation. In order to answer that question, one must understand the distinction between subjective and objective truth. To say that some statement is objectively true is to say that it is true regardless of whether anyone believes in it or not. For example, “2 + 2 = 4” is objectively true because even if everyone thought otherwise, it would still be the case that two plus two equals four.[5]  To say that some statement is subjectively true is to say that its truth depends upon whether someone believes it to be true. “Chocolate is the best flavor of ice cream”, for example, is subjectively true for me because I believe it to be the best. But for you, it might be subjectively true that vanilla is the best flavor of ice cream.[6] And of course, we both recognize that, objectively speaking, both flavors of ice cream are on a par (i.e., neither has the property of being best). It should be clear that while subjective truth is person-relative, objective truth is not.

With that in mind, the reason people react so negatively to religious exclusivism is because they see religion as a subjective phenomenon; it is not thought to have as its goal objective truth.[7]  To give an example, “Christianity is true” is taken to be on the same level, or to express the same type of statement as, “Chocolate is the best flavor of ice cream.” Neither statement intends to express a fact about the world. Both merely tell us what the speaker feels is best or likes the most. When someone says, “Buddhism is false”, for example, they might as well be saying, “You’re wrong, vanilla is not the best flavor of ice cream.” If someone were to look a vanilla lover in the face and tell them they’ve got the wrong view about ice cream, we would all rightly react with indignation. That is how most people feel about the person who says that some religion is false.

III. The Nature of Religious Belief

But what if that is not the way religions are? What if the religions of mankind have as their goal objectivity and the way the world really is? In that case, bona fide disagreements between religions can arise, and it is no more intolerant (in the traditional sense) to say that Buddhism is false than it is to say that “2 + 2 = 5” is false. The situation would be very similar to disagreements in science, mathematics, and history. Indeed, this seems to be the case. Given that most religions purports to explain how the universe began, whether human beings have a soul, the nature of the afterlife, and the nature of God, it seems undeniable that they do intend to capture or teach objective truth. What does it mean, for example, to say that it is subjectively true that there is an afterlife? Or that is subjectively true that humans have a soul? These statements only make sense if we understand them as trying to capture the true nature of reality, as objective statements about the world.

At this point, a religious pluralist might respond that a follower of some religion could like and be most attracted to the beliefs of his religion, but not really think that those beliefs are true. Perhaps this is the way most people understand their religion. In this way, religion is still subjective. This response strikes me as completely inadequate. First, it is false that most people regard their religion as subjectively true. Religious wars, for example, are not motivated by people who merely like their religion the most; they are motivated by people who believe their religion to be true, and indeed the only truth. Secondly, and more importantly, we need to distinguish between religion itself and adherents to a religion. Adherents to Christianity, for example, may have a subjective view of the existence of God (i.e., they like the idea of God), but that in no way implies that Christianity itself is intended to express merely subjective truth; all that follows is that said-adherent are acting inconsistently. Whether or not followers regard their religion as objectively or subjectively true will have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. In any case, it is irrelevant to the current discussion, which has to do with the content of a religion, not the adherents of a religion.

IV. The Significance of Inconsistent Religious Beliefs

Having seen that religions have as their proper goal the ways things really are, we now turn to the question of whether or not all religions can be true. It is very clear to me that they cannot. The argument here has two steps: (1) establishing that inconsistent beliefs cannot all be true and (2) establishing that world religions have inconsistent beliefs about the world. Turning to step one, most should be able to agree that if world religions have sharp and fundamental disagreements, then they cannot all be true, on pain of contradiction. They could all be false, but they could not all be true. To say otherwise would be like saying “two plus two equals four” and “two plus two equals five” are both true statements. It is literally nonsense. For this reason, I take step two as obviously true.

In response, religious pluralists will typically question whether or not logic is applicable to God and the fundamental nature of reality (i.e., the chief concerns of religion). If this is the case, then inconsistent, and even contradictory, religions could all be true. How might we respond to this suggestion? First, when the laws of logic are contemplated, it is clear that they are universal in scope.

• The Law of Identity - A is identical to A. In other words, something cannot be non-identical with itself; something cannot be something that it is not.

• The Law of the Excluded Middle - A statement is either true or false. The statement, “My name is Miles Donahue”, for example, must be either true or false; there is no third option.

• The Law of Non-Contradiction - A statement cannot be both truth and false at the same time in the same way. For example, if “My name is Miles Donahue” is a true statement, then “My name is not Miles Donahue” is necessarily false; they cannot both be true, and they cannot both be false. An implication of the law is that truth is not self-contradictory.

The point is, by merely mentally entertaining the laws of logic, we know that there cannot be any exceptions to them, including religious realities. Can the pluralist seriously maintain, with a straight face, that contradictory statements can both be true? Can he maintain that, for example, the atheist and the Christian can both be correct about the existence of God? It seems to me that if they are willing to bite the bullet and affirm these seemingly meaningless statements, that is their problem.

Second, the religious pluralist’s position is self-refuting. The pluralist presupposes logic when arguing that logic is not applicable to God and the ultimate nature of the universe (what we might call "Ultimate Reality"). They assert that it is true that logic does not apply to Ultimate Reality, and that it is false that logic does apply to Ultimate Reality. But these bifurcations between true and false depend necessarily on the validity of logic. If the pluralist disagrees, just ask them if they think that the statement, “Logic applies to religious realities”, is true. If they do not, then you can reply, “Ah, but according to you logic doesn’t apply to the fundamental nature reality!”, and so contradictions can be true. In other words, it can be true that logic does and does not apply to the things spoken of by religion. Even more than that, it can be the case that the following two statements are both true:

1. It is true that logic applies to God and it is false that logic does not apply to God.
2. It is false that logic applies to God and it is true that logic does not apply to God.

In other words, the consistent pluralist must affirm both (1) and (2). It this seems like complete and total nonsense, that's because it is. Nonsense affirmations like these represent the meaninglessness and absurdity that result from denying the inapplicability of logic to any facet of reality, including Ultimate Reality.

At this point, pluralists of this particular stripe can regroup and come back with a modified proposal, what I'll call the otherness of God. Instead of saying that contradictory statements can be true of God, their position now is that God is beyond all such statements about Him. He is beyond the distinction between omnipresence and no presence, omnipotence and impotence, and even good and evil. He literally has no attributes, because any attribute one could assign to Him implies that he is not something else. One cannot, for example, say that God is timeless because that would exclude Him from being temporal. God must be beyond all such limitations. In short, God is beyond all dualities (i.e., pairs of contradictory statements or attributes). Instead, He is completely and utterly other.

If this proposal is meant to allow the pluralist to maintain the all religions can be objectively true, it fails miserably. Far from making it the case that all religions correctly capture the Divine, this position implies that most religions are uniformly false. For if God does not literally have any attribute or quality (because He must be beyond them all), then any statement ascribing some attribute to Him must be false. When the Bible says that God is all-loving, it cannot be literally true, for God is neither loving nor hateful. When the Qur'an says that God is eternal, it cannot be true because God is neither eternal nor temporal. God is beyond even the good/bad and eternal/temporal distinctions. Nevertheless, room might be made here for certain camps of Hinduism and Taoism, which envision the Ultimate Reality as beyond all distinctions and qualities; but room is not made for the three major theistic religions of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Insofar as this is meant to be an argument for pluralism, then, it fails.

But leave these considerations aside. Can the otherness of God then be reasonably affirmed? I think not. My primary reservation is, such a view reduces Ultimate Reality to nothing at all. If nothing can be truly predicated of God/Ultimate Reality, then it has no attributes or qualities whatsoever. And if it has no characteristics or attributes, then it does not exist. The reasoning here is this: as I contemplate the idea that God is beyond all dualities, it seems to me such a view implies that the word God has literally no content. Words are given meaning by describing what they refer to. But if God has no attributes at all, then no statement can truly describe Him or refer to Him. Accordingly, God has no content; it might as well be a synonym for "nothing." To give an example, suppose someone tells you that he believes in the Tripleminac, but explains that this entity has no attributes, qualities, or characteristics. Would you be convinced that your friend actually believes in something, rather than nothing at all? You'd rightly conclude that "Tripleminac" is devoid of content and so does not refer to anything; it's just an empty word. And what is true of the Tripleminac is true of a God beyond dualities. If I'm right, then it should be the atheist giving this argument, not the pluralist!

"Ah, but," the pluralist responds, "the statement 'God is beyond dualities' refers to God and so gives the word 'God' content. As such, God is not like the Tripleminac." But now the truly damning objection to the otherness of God arises: it is self-refuting and incoherent, just like its predecessor. Consider the following pair of statements:

1. God is beyond dualities.
2. God is not beyond dualities.

Presumably, the otherness of God affirms (1); that is to say, (1) is true of God. And yet, (1) and (2) represent a duality of two statements, and so God must be beyond them both. In short, (1) cannot be literally true of God, which contradicts the pluralist's initial assertion. Moreover, if God is beyond all dualities, he must be beyond the attribute being beyond dualities, a contradiction in terms. Again the mind begins to boggle, teetering on the edge of rationality and insanity. But that is the author's intention. Surely no sane pluralist can affirm such nonsensical and unintelligible views as this. In any case, it is not incumbent upon us to affirm them with him.

So I must conclude that the attempt to remove Ultimate Reality from all pairs of contradictory statements fails, as it (1) condemns most religions as literally false, (2) reduces God to nothing at all, and, in the final analysis, (3) is deeply self-refuting. In summary, the pluralist cannot maintain that logic is inapplicable to religious realities or that such realities are beyond dualities. Logic and commonsense, low and behold, have won out. If there is an Ultimate Reality, it must be susceptible to logical comprehension.

V. The Reality of Inconsistent Teachings

Turning to step two, it seems that world religions do have genuine, irreconcilably different answers to life’s most fundamental questions.[8]  All religions address three central questions, but each answers them differently. Only someone manifestly ignorant of world religions could maintain that they all teach the same thing. In the first place, different religions have different beliefs about humanity and the universe’s origin. For example, according to Christianity, God created the universe out of nothing a finite time ago and brought human beings into existence (out of nothing or through the process of evolution). Hinduism, on the other hand, teaches that the universe is eternal, cycling through death and rebirth from infinity past into infinity future.[9] Moreover, the vast majority of ancient religions viewed the beginning of the world as the formation of an ordered Cosmos out of preexistent matter, inconsistent with Christian teaching. Of course, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism have similar beliefs about origins, but that does nothing to undermine the differences all three have with every other religion.

In the second place, world religions have different beliefs about mankind’s purpose in the world. For instance, Islam teaches that we are made to serve Allah and bring the world into submission with the House of Islam, whereas Buddhism and Hinduism teach that our purpose is to escape the cycle of reincarnation (or to reach enlightenment, if you prefer). Christianity disagrees with all three religions in that it sees coming to know and love God as our fundamental purpose. In sum, humanity’s goal in life is radically different across different religious traditions.

In the third place, world religions have different understandings of mankind’s destiny. According to Christianity, for example, mankind has one life on Earth and then either exists forever with God (Heaven), or is cast out from his presence forever (Hell), whereas Buddhism and Hinduism teach that the human soul is reincarnated indefinitely after death. Moreover, Christianity and Islam propose different means of achieving salvation or the heavenly state. According to Christianity, salvation is achieved through belief in Jesus of Nazareth’s death on the cross for the sins of the world, and his resurrection three days later. Islam, on the other hand, teaches that anyone who believes in Christ for his salvation is destined to Hell.[10]  In short, the world’s religions present very different, and indeed irreconcilable, pictures of the origin, purpose, and destiny of mankind and the universe.

  

VI. Conclusion

It has been argued that (1) world religions teach inconsistent things about life’s most fundamental questions, and (2) any group of inconsistent statements cannot all be true. From these two premises, it follows necessarily that (3) the world’s religions cannot all be true.[11]  Let us now comment on the implications of (3). One’s choice of religious belief has very meaningful and very real consequences. If Islam is true, non-Muslims are destined to Hell. If Christianity is true, the only way of salvation is through Christ.[12]  If Buddhism is true, the only way to escape the process of reincarnation and the suffering associated with it is through enlightenment. The choices one makes and the beliefs one has take on dramatic significance. It is the exclusivist, not the pluralist, who elevates the meaningfulness of religious belief and takes its claims seriously.

The question that arises now is: how can we, as rational and responsible people, find out which religion is true? Or if atheism is true, how can we know? As I am a Christian theist, I feel no guilt in giving a distinctly Christian answer. As I see it, there are two ways of coming to a knowledge of Christianity’s truth. First, the evidential path is exactly what it sounds like: coming to know that Christianity is true because that is where the evidence points. It seems to me that a powerful historical argument can be given for the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth two thousand years ago, and powerful philosophical arguments can be given for the existence of God. But whether or not we accept the validity of those arguments, the point is that Christianity in particular and world religions in general can be assessed through rational argument and evidence.

Second, the experiential path is the way most people know Christianity to be true. Essentially, this is the claim that one can know that Christianity is true wholly apart from argument and evidence, by directly experiencing the Holy Spirit in one’s life. Beliefs like this are called properly basic beliefs. A prime example of a properly basic belief is belief in the reality of the external world. Ask yourself, how do you know that there really is an external world of physical objects “out there”? How do you know you’re not in the matrix, lying on a table somewhere and only imagining the world around you? You certainly don’t know it on the basis of evidence; any evidence you might point to will ultimately rely on the reality of the external world in the first place. That is why beliefs like these are basic. And they are properly basic because they are not arbitrary or irrational. Belief in the external world, for example, is rational to hold because it is grounded in your experience of the world around you, and you have no reason to deny that experience. Now turn back to the Holy Spirit. Why cannot the experience of the Holy Spirit in one’s life ground the properly basic belief in the truth of Christianity?[13] In the absence of any reason to think that I am delusional or that God does not exist, why am I not rational to accept what experience tells me?[14] 

The most damning objection to the proper basicality of belief in Christianity is the fact that a non-Christian could claim the same thing about belief in their religion. The Muslim, for instance, could claim that they experience Allah in their life, and that this serves to ground their belief in the central truths of Islam. Or again, the Mormon could claim that while reading the Book of Mormon, they are convicted in their heart of its truth. The point is, multiple religious experiences between incompatible religions seem to cancel each other out. But perhaps that conclusion comes too soon. Consider two things.

(1) Different experiences can serve to warrant different religious beliefs. Experiences are by their very nature private affairs. They can only warrant the beliefs of the one who actually possesses the experiences, and so cannot cancel each other out. It is not like I possess both experiences; in that case, they would undercut one another. My experience of the Holy Spirit warrants my belief in Christianity, and a Muslim's experience of Allah serves to warrant his belief in Islam. Why does the fact that someone else has a different experience than me in any way undercut the experience that I do have? Why does someone else's experience of Allah undercut my experience of the Holy Spirit? They are warranted in believing in Islam, and I am warranted in believing in Christianity. In other words, I can only worry about the experiences that I have, because that is all I will ever have access to. Now of course, we can't both be having veridical, objective experiences. We may both be warranted in our beliefs, but we cannot both be right. This leads to my second response.

(2) Properly basic beliefs can be defeated. Imagine walking down the road and seeing a tall building in the distance. Your experience of seeing the building warrants your belief that there is a building in the distance. But as you hike further on, you realize that the tall building you thought you saw was actually a painting of a tall building. Now your properly basic belief in the building has been defeated; you are no longer rational in holding to it. By the same token, properly basic religious beliefs can be defeated. It seems to me that powerful arguments have been lodged against the Islamic and Mormon religions, and those arguments serve to defeat a follower's properly basic belief in their religion. I do not think the same thing can be said against the Christian. There is no good reason to think that Christianity is false, and so one's properly basic belief in its truth is still warranted (e.g., it has not been defeated).

For these two reasons, I don't think any significant conclusions follow from the diversity of religious experiences. An interesting point to be made here is while theistic religions and a few others can justifiably claim to have a religious experience that warrants their central beliefs, atheism cannot. For what, on atheism, would function to justify a belief that God does not exist? Would they appeal to the atheistic Holy Spirit who testifies to them that God does not exist? There just doesn't seem to be any comparable mechanism that could warrant a properly basic belief in atheism.

To sum up, both evidence and experience can be brought to bear when deciding which of the world religions is true.

I realize this paper raises more questions than answers, but I see these reflections as a stepping-off point for further discussion, consideration, and inquiry. As Socrates said, the unreflective life is not worth living. No matter the cultural stance or the social consequences of calling some belief into question, question everything and subject everything to the withering light of day in the knowledge that that which is true and good will hold firm.

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[1] Let me lay my cards out on the table: I am a Christian theist. But that fact has not influenced this paper in the slightest. Judge my argument by the strength of their supporting evidence, not my personal beliefs.

[2] A note on definitions: religious exclusivism and pluralism come in a variety of definitions and uses, so I appreciate that others may understand them differently. But I will use them throughout the paper as I have defined them here.

[3] William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland in, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, 415-416. Here they are speaking of the principle of tolerance as it relates to one’s moral views, but their comments apply equally to one’s religious viewpoints.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Objectively true statements are typically called facts.

[6] Subjectively true statements are popularly called opinions.

[7] Of course, animosity is always generated when someone questions another’s deep-seated and cherished beliefs. But in the present case, anger is lit even when someone speaks in abstracto, proposing that there might be one true religion, without mentioning a particular candidate. This implies that something else is at work here.

[8] Two caveats. (1) Not by a long shot have I studied world religions in-depth. The following information reflects the best that I can gather from the resources I have taken advantage of. I am open to any corrections, if any are needed. Moreover, I realize that I’ve but scratched the surface of each religion. (2) The following discussion is limited to the beliefs of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Nevertheless, similar points could be made about most other religions.

[9] Relatedly, Christianity presents a God who is personal, just as humans are personal. But according to Hinduism, God or Brahma is more akin to an impersonal force. This isn’t an insignificant secondary difference; it is because God is personal that humans can enter into a personal relationship with Him, the purpose of life according to Christianity.

[10] Ex. “It is blasphemy they utter, those who say that God is Christ the son of Mary! For Christ has said: ‘O Children of Israel, worship God, my Lord and your Lord.’ Whoso ascribes partners to God, God proscribes the Garden to him, and his final refuge is the Fire.” - Sura 5, verses 71-72. Tarif Khalidi, The Qur’an, (The Penguin Group, 2008), 92.

[11] Notice the modesty of this conclusion. It is not salvation is only available through one religion, nor does that follow from (3). For example, perhaps Christian universalism is the only true religion, but nevertheless, universalism teaches that other religions are genuine sources of salvation as well. Further, the conclusion is better stated as all religions cannot be completely true. It’s very possible that world religions each have elements of truth in them; but they cannot all be completely true.

[12] Assuming the untenability of Christian universalism.

[13] At the very least, we should be able to admit the possibility of this proposal.

[14] Of course, I cannot point to that private experience as a reason for you to accept Christianity. Rather, the witness of the Holy Spirit serves to ground my belief alone; if I wanted to show you that the Christian message is true, I would go the route of argument and evidence.